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The Somali civil war of 1991 left thousands of refugees
scattered in neighbouring countries. This article examines
the situation of the 130,000 Somalis in their second dec-
ade in Dadaab camps in Kenya, with a particular focus
on the role and responsibilities of the refugee regime and
the host state. It is argued that these camps are charac-
terized by deprivations of both material and physical secu-
rity. Research found that refugees’ dependency on
inadequate aid is due to lack of alternative livelihoods
rather than “dependency syndrome.” However, partici-
pants expressed diminished “self-esteem” resulting from
their prolonged encampment. Finally, the paper presents
a critique of the failure to explore solutions for protracted
refugee situations on the part of the international refugee
regime.
Résumé
La guerre civile de 1991 en Somali a laissé des milliers de
réfugiés éparpillés dans les pays avoisinants. Cet article
examine le sort des 130,000 somaliens qui sont à leur
deuxième décennie dans les camps de Dadaab au Kenya,
avec une emphase particulière sur le rôle et les responsabi-
lités de la convention sur les réfugiés et du pays hôte. L’ar-
ticle soutient que ces camps sont caractérisés par un
manque de sécurité tant au niveau physique que maté-
riel. Des études ont démontré que la dépendance des réfu-
giés sur de l’assistance – quoique cette assistance est
elle-même insuffisante – découle d’une absence de voies
alternatives pour gagner sa vie plutôt d’un syndrome de
dépendance. Toutefois, les participants ont exprimé un
sens diminué d’estime de soi, résultant de leur séjour pro-
longé dans le camp. Pour terminer. L’article examine de
façon critique le fait que la convention internationale sur
les réfugiés ait failli dans son devoir de rechercher des so-
lutions alternatives pour des gens se retrouvant comme
réfugiés pour un laps de temps prolongé.
P
rotracted political limbo still prevails in Somalia as it
enters its fourteenth year of “statelessness.” Despite
the precarious situation of Somali refugees scattered
across many parts of the world, both the country and the
plight of its refugees remain off the radar of world media.
The atrocities committed in the process of tumbling Siad
Barre’s regime in 1991, and the clan-based power struggles
that followed, led to the displacement of hundreds of thou-
sands of Somalis. The refugees initially fled to the neigh-
bouring countries of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya,
subsequently moving on to countries near and far. Those
who were fortunate enough to escape the trials and tribula-
tions inherent in exile in countries such as Kenya, where
existing resources are barely able to meet the basic needs of
the native population and where most refugees still remain
in closed camps, moved on to more prosperous countries
where they obtained refugee status. Most refugees were not
so fortunate, however.1
The focus of this paper is on the approximately 130,000
Somali refugees who remain in limbo in camps in the North
Eastern Province of Kenya (NEP).2 Dadaab, a name given
to three camps (Hagadera, Ifo, and Dhagahley), is located
about 100 kilometres from the Somali-Kenya border. These
camps were created in mid-1992 after it became almost
impossible for the international humanitarian regime to
run the camps in Liboi, a border region too close to south-
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ern Somalia where violence was still occurring on a daily
basis. Security concerns for international staff, refugees,
and humanitarian supplies all led to the creation of new
camps further inside Kenyan territory. The region where
Dadaab camps are located is semi-arid and was sparsely
populated by nomadic Somali-Kenyans before the arrival
of refugees fleeing the war. Hostilities between Kenya and
Somalia, which claimed the Somali-inhabited  Northern
Frontier District (NFD) as a missing Somali territory and
supported regional independence movements, persisted
since independence in the early 1960s. Due to this tension,
Kenya kept NFD, now known as North Eastern Province of
Kenya (NEP), and its population under a permanent state
of emergency from independence until 1992.3
The scale of the refugees fleeing across the Kenyan border
in the early 1990s overwhelmed both the small local no-
madic population and the available scarce natural resources
of the area. The presence of international organizations
nevertheless brought this previously marginalized region
some attention with the provision of services such as bore-
holes, hospitals, and schools. By March 2003, about
160,000 of the more than 400,000 Somali refugees who fled
to Kenya at the height of the war remained in Kenya. Of
these, 130,000 were in the three Dadaab camps, with a
smaller numbers in the Kakuma camps in Northwestern
Kenya, and the remainder living in urban centers such as
Nairobi. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) administers the camps, with CARE responsible
for social services, WFP (World Food Program) for food,
and MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières) for health care.4
While cognizant of the role the failed state of Somalia and
warlords  still engaged  in power struggles  played in the
plight of Somali refugees, the central theme of the paper is
the role and responsibilities of those charged with caring
for refugees after they are in refugee camps in neighbouring
countries. The paper argues that encampment and pro-
tracted refugee situations leave thousands of men, women,
and children living in limbo, resulting in wasted human
capacity and deprivations of human dignity. Research in
Dadaab found that refugees are dismayed by their depend-
ency on inadequate aid, and express diminished self-worth
due to their inability to better their situation or to escape
from the conditions of camp life. The failure of the host
state and the international community to bring about any
effective intervention to free refugees from this limbo state
is also examined. Here the emphasis is on the neglect of the
Kenyan government, as a signatory state to many human
rights and refugee covenants, to enforce the refugees’ legal
rights under international law. Any positive and proactive
commitment on the part of this government, the paper
argues, would have gone a long way to alleviate the refugees’
predicament. Finally, I argue that the international refugee
regime’s mantra of durable solutions – reintegration, reset-
tlement and repatriation – as the only viable options often
translates to no solution and leads to a protracted state as
demonstrated by the situation in which refugees find them-
selves. Refusal to explore other options of addressing the
refugee crisis, other than care and maintenance, to end the
limbo status of these refugees causes devastating conse-
quences for displaced populations.
Encampment: Dependency, Deprivations, and
Refugee “Persona”
Humanitarian organizations upon their arrival in disaster
zones rarely have the luxury to assess whether camps are the
best option to address human catastrophes.5 Once camps are
created, however, the initially hoped temporality often turns
out to have been wishful thinking, as demonstrated by the
many cases of protracted refugee situations in the last two
decades.6 Examples of refugees in limbo for over a decade
include “Tigrayans and Eritreans in Sudan, Afghans in Paki-
stan and Iran, Salvadorians in Honduras, Cambodians and
Laotians in Thailand, Mozambicans in Malawi, Angolans in
Zaire, and Vietnamese boat people in different countries in
Southeast Asia.”7 We should add Rwandan refugees in Tan-
zania and Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen.
On paper, UNHCR claims that “the establishment of refugee
camps must be only a last resort. A solution that maintains
and fosters the self-reliance of the refugees is always prefer-
able.”8 Nevertheless, camps become the first choice to “man-
age” a refugee crisis. Certainly difficulties abound for the
humanitarian community in managing and assisting people
dispersed over a vast land in emergency situations; yet, as
will be demonstrated by this paper, camps as the only solu-
tion for the administration of humanitarian assistance ne-
glect the short-term and long-term detrimental effects on
refugees.
Camps often established in peripheral regions lead to
segregation and marginalization of refugees.9 The interna-
tional humanitarian organizations administering these
camps function under different norms of culture, lan-
guages, and politics than the refugees they aid. Refugees in
the crisis phase welcome the assistance strangers bestow on
them and remain acquiescent to camp regimentation.
However, once the emergency period passes, with camp
entering a care and maintenance phase, refugees experience
few changes in the routines of scheduled ration distribu-
tions, head counts, and visits of international dignitaries.
Resentment and conflict towards the aid apparatus fol-
lows.10 Aggravating these inadequacies further is the prohi-
bition of freedom of movement to which refugees in closed
camps are subjected, a constraint that greatly hampers
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refugees’ ability to seek alternative livelihood strategies out-
side camps. Coupling this last restriction with the difficul-
ties international humanitarian organizations experience
in raising sufficient funds to continue to administer the
camps with adequate  provisions  beyond  the emergency
phase renders camps domains of material scarcity.
Arguments against this type of encampment include that
camps engender passivity, breaking down all initiatives and
self-worthiness of refugees. Hand-to-mouth arrangements
of awaiting others to provide all one’s needs eventually
translate to complete dependency on donations.11 How-
ever, while acknowledging the need for these rations for
refugees whose other options are constrained both by the
environment of camp locations, and also by national laws
prohibiting or limiting employment prospects, some re-
searchers contest this “dependency syndrome.”12 Instead,
Kibreab, using Somali-Ethiopian refugees in Somalia in the
1970s and 1980s as an example, argues:
[t]he majority of refugees in the camps were willing to expend
their labour on economic activities, often for very small return,
and also, in some cases, to take the risk of relinquishing their
ration cards for the uncertain alternative of self-sufficiency.
Among the able bodied refugees, there was no evidence at all
that the refugees’ willingness to take initiatives and to work hard
either to earn an income or to augment their diet was negatively
affected by prolonged dependency on handouts.13
Clark also refutes the concept of a dependency syn-
drome. Instead, he asserts that “the apparent dependency
of refugees derives from their removal from their social,
political and economic coping systems.”14 While depend-
ency is acknowledged here, the reasons why refugees may
become dependent are contested: instead of “laziness” or
“welfare mentality,” this argument partly blames the struc-
tural constraints to which refugees are subjected in camps,
equated with Goffmanesque “total institutions.”15 Despite
the different rationales for refugee dependency, a consensus
exists within the literature of the sufferings of refugees in
“closed camps” living in limbo and dependent on dwin-
dling rations for years. Due to the disruption of refugees’
social and economic networks, long-term encampment
further negatively impacts on the future reintegration of
refugees into their home countries.16
Research with Afghani refugees in Pakistan found that
more than the social dislocation of being outside of their
home country, “what is disruptive and potentially most
threatening to Pakhtun refugees is not social dislocation so
much as the contradictions posed by the framing experi-
ence of becoming _ in multiple senses of the word _ refu-
gees.”17 This last finding emphasizes the disempowerment
refugees experience when they no longer toil on their land
and survive on their sweat but wait around for food distri-
bution, perceived as non-reciprocal charity bestowed on
them. Acceptance of these donations is perceived as being
contradictory to the Pakhtun culture. Also research with
Vietnamese  refugees  in  Southeast  Asian camps demon-
strates that more than the enclosure and fences surround-
ing the camps, what is most damaging about closed camps
is the uncertainty of their prospects of leaving the camps,
and the camp administration’s expectation for refugees to
self-represent themselves  as “helpless  supplicants under
suspicion.”18
Data collected from Somali refugees in Dadaab confirms
the deprivations refugees experience in protracted refugee
situations. Interviewees detail the precariousness of their
day-to-day lives, which is unfortunately also substantiated
by camp administration reports. For example, WFP often
raises alarm bells about the impending starvation of refu-
gees in Dadaab or in Kenya. The food WFP is able to secure
for these refugees always falls short of the daily calorific
requirement, with reduction of both the quantity and qual-
ity of rations. Refugees expressed to this author their frus-
tration with this situation. Foodstuffs distributed are
actually often scorned. Many argue that the quality of the
grains distributed is “not fit for humans.” Moreover, most
research participants dwelled on the lack of variety in their
rations, and also the cultural inappropriateness of maize as
the main staple provided. “The food distributed per person
has now been reduced to three kilograms of maize per
person per fortnight” is a statement that was reiterated by
all refugees. Flour, a staple most Somalis utilize to prepare
anjero (flat bread), is rarely found in their bimonthly ra-
tions. By the end of my first trip to Dadaab, August 2001,
refugees had not received flour for almost a whole year. The
refugees contrast this with the rations they received at the
beginning of their arrival in the camps, which were not only
double what they were in 2001, but also included a variety
of grains. During those days, refugees were able to sell some
of the rations to buy other food items such as meat, milk,
and vegetables that are not provided by the camp admini-
stration.
Refugee diet, which should in theory include pulses and
vegetables, rarely contains these, and often results in high
rates of malnutrition amongst women and children. Dur-
ing my first trip to Dadaab in summer 2001, MSF reported
a dramatic increase of 172 per cent in the malnutrition rate
of Somali refugee children within a period of six months
due to a 35 per cent decrease in the general food distribution
in the camps.19 Only a small number of refugees receiving
remittances from the diaspora and those involved in petty
trade/business are able to supplement these meager rations.
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Affording “meat and milk” (cad iyo caano), two words that
together signify subsistence in the Somali language and
originally comprising nomads’ main foodstuffs, is a luxury
very few refugees can afford. An interesting item illustrating
the precariousness of refugee life is the price of food items
in Dadaab. A woman who sells some of her grain to buy
milk for a baby would sell her maize for 5 Kenyan shillings
per kilogram. However, one glass of milk costs 10 Kenyan
shillings.20 For a mother to provide this one glass for a small
child, she would have to sell two kilos of the maize she
received that morning, accounting for two-thirds of the
main ration the child receives for two weeks.
Despite the deprivations discussed above, the depend-
ency identified in Dadaab resembles more that discussed by
Clark, namely loss of “social, political and economic coping
systems,”21 rather than any “welfare mentality” or laziness.
Refugees’ discussions highlight their lack of alternatives to
rations distributed. Refugees repeatedly dwell on how em-
ployment and/or gaining one’s livelihood is desirable but
impossible in the camp settings. Lack of material resources
and employment prospects obliges most to rely solely on
the bimonthly rations. For most refugees who are not in-
volved in trade and who don’t receive remittances, depend-
ency on aid remains the only option. However, in spite of
camp constraints, I found that refugees desire and hope to
be freed from the “beggarly” positions they occupy as de-
pendents on insufficient aid. One interviewee reported that
she cleaned the premises of one of the NGOs for free for
weeks, until some NGO staff took notice and a small remu-
neration was offered to her. This permitted her to supple-
ment the meager distributed rations for her and her four
children. This woman, among others, demonstrated a te-
nacity to better her situation in an environment of scarce
resources. All around the camps, one sees women selling
small pockets of sugar or spices to make just enough to buy
a glass of milk for the smallest children. Thus, as much as
camp appearances portray people always waiting for some-
thing, the desire to provide for one’s family was expressed
by almost all refugees. And this challenges the claim that
refugees become dependents on aid because of unwilling-
ness to provide or work for their sustenance.
Self-Perception: Refugee Identity
Another theme often coupled with dependency syndrome is
loss of self-worthiness that may result from protracted refu-
gee situations. This author’s research in Dadaab significantly
supports this argument. Refugees’ self-representation as
“refugees” was often very negative. Most refer to themselves
as “qoxooti,”22 often portrayed as a dreaded “identity,” and
often only associated with others.
A refugee is a fenced person. (Hawa M. Ali)23
The word refugee, in my opinion, in our heads, it means a weak
individual; that is how we see ourselves. We ourselves don’t like
it when we are called “refugees”; we are not happy with it. But
what can you do? It is a weak person, a person whose country
was destroyed; it means a poor person, who has nothing, who
is begging food that is handed down. That is what it means to
me. (Sa’ida M. Farah)
A person who is sitting somewhere as if he/she was handi-
capped! There are no men who are employed in this block, who
go to work in the morning and who gain a living. They are sitting
around the house. They are unemployed. Nowhere to find jobs!
(Aliya S. Abdi)
Refugee is poverty and hunger. A loser standing around, that is
a refugee. I think of poverty, praying to Allah: “Allah, take us
out of this misery,” this suffering and hardship, carrying water
on your bare back, searching for wood in the bushes, lack of
milk for your children, unemployment, that is it. (Hodan F.
Abdirahman)
A refugee is someone suffering. A refugee is someone who is in
need. A refugee is someone who has nothing. That is how I
interpret the word refugee. If we had any way of freeing our-
selves, we would not be in this refugee camp tonight. (Halima
K. Bile)
“Refugee” is not a pleasant word. When someone is told, “you
are a refugee,” it is a word that hurts. A “refugee” is a person
who abandoned his habitat, who lives in a territory that is not
his, and who lives miserably and desperately, constantly worry-
ing. Hence, “refugee” is a word that bothers us. And when
someone is called a refugee, it hurts us. I mean you are seen as
someone who is less than others, who is worst. So, as refugees,
when we are told, “you are a refugee,” we see it as if we are
despised, weaker and less than other people. It depresses us
every time the word is used. I see it as weak, someone who is not
capable of anything. That is how I see the word refugee. (Kaha
A. Bihi)
Refugees frequently refer to the constraints on their free-
dom of movement in closed camps. People use metaphors
drawn from nomadic animal herding: “fenced like live-
stock.” “Living in a prison where the sky is open” is another
way refugees illustrate their condition. Fencing symbols
suggest hindrances to refugees’ capacity to escape the
dearth of material conditions and the deprivations in the
camps. Many refer to their wish or hope one day to be freed
from the conditions of “refugeehood.” To this end, both
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men and women often recited prayers. A refugee persona,
however, as much as it is despised, as illustrated by the
images of “refugee” above, is also assumed when recount-
ing the harshness of camp life. As Harrell-Bond and others
have argued, refugees assume this “victimized” persona
after a certain time in camps.24 In fact the conditions exist-
ing in Dadaab render it very easy for refugees to internalize
this persona. Deprivation of both material and physical
security characterizes Dadaab camps, and one discerns in
refugees’ narratives a denial of being the definitions they
associate with the identity “refugee.” These definitions em-
body refugees’ ambiguity towards this identity: what they
perceive as an undesirable identity, “qoxooti,” and that they
are “qoxooti” in Dadaab camps.
Insecurity: Fenced for the Enemy?
Instead of hospitality, refugees in limbo often experience
exploitation, extreme insecurity, and constant harassment,
not only from local populations, but also from national
authorities and policies fueling  unfavourable sentiments
towards the newcomers.25 This hostility may partially stem
from the deprivation persisting in refugee-hosting areas.
Local populations in these regions often end up more mar-
ginalized than the refugees, who receive international hu-
manitarian aid which at least permits them to meet
subsistence needs. When excluded from this aid, host popu-
lations tend to resent refugees and view the newcomers as
“enemies” or competitors. Scarce resources, such as fire-
wood and water, become contested when the sudden popu-
lation increase leads to high consumption of limited
resources.26 However, I argue that conflict with refugees in
this situation should not be interpreted as hostility towards
refugees per se; rather, conflict in areas where water and
pasture scarcity prevails is often the norm. For example, in
the North Eastern province of Kenya where the Dadaab
camps are located, local Somali Kenyan populations histori-
cally and presently experience clan conflicts due to pasture
and water paucity. To expect “hospitality” beyond the short-
term for refugees, even if amongst co-ethnics, when the local
populations persistently experience violent confrontations,
is unrealistic. Rather, in an environment of scarcity, a “sur-
vival-of-the-fittest” mentality translates to refugees often
being victimized in the relationship with host populations.
The persistence of insecurity in Dadaab camps illustrates
this often-tense relation between locals and refugees. High-
lighting the scale of this concern, UNHCR reported that, at
the height of gender-based violence, there were 200 docu-
mented rapes in Dadaab in 1993. In the subsequent four
years, the number of  officially recorded rapes averaged
between 70 and 105. But rapes again increased to 164
in1998, fell to 71 in 1999, rose again to 108 in 2000, 72 in
2001.27 Given the stigma attached to rape within the Somali
culture, reported rapes fall far short of the actual number
of cases.28 Most of the rapes in Dadaab occur in the outskirts
of the camps. Depletion of firewood in this semi-arid region
obliges women to travel further and further in search of fuel
for cooking. UNHCR documented over 100 rapes from
February to August 2002.29 Most of the perpetrators are
allegedly Somali nomads from the area, deegaanka,30 often
referred to as “shiftas.”31
Another example of insecurity reported by refugees is
bandits raiding the camps. These incursions coincide with
material donations such as plastic bags distributed to cover
refugees’ makeshift houses, and/or bimonthly ration distri-
butions. The bandits often rob refugees of any valuables
they may have, targeting those suspected of owning mate-
rial goods and those receiving remittances, and even rob-
bing poorer refugees of their rations. It was reported that
the shiftas use the women to transport the rations, sub-
sequently raping and at times killing them in the outskirts
of the camps.
One-woman interviewee referred to a rape she wit-
nessed:
I saw it with my own eyes. She was caught and raped at the door,
her pants32 pulled off, a girl of 15 years old, a gang, vagabonds,
losers and shiftas, there you are, you are watching it, you scream,
but you cannot free her from them, you are standing at your
door. The conflict we fled, yesterday when NGOs (hay’adihii),
assisted us, when we got settled, assisted us well, we thank them
for it, we thank Allah for it, when we settled, our children started
schools, when we would have done something for ourselves, an
enemy was born (cadow baa dhulkii oo dhan ka dhaqaaqay). The
other conflict might even have been better; at least we could get
out, we could move around even if a bullet hits you. And now
we miss that. In that one, we could move around, during the
conflict, we could move; now we cannot move around. You just
sit around (waaba saas u yuurur). (Ebla A. Hersi)
Additionally, the Kenyan police stationed in the camps
to protect the refugees reportedly commit violence against
and rapes of refugees. Banditry,  coupled with fear and
distrust of those responsible for their protection, renders
the situation of refugees, especially women refugees, doubly
oppressive. Amelioration of the security situation in
Dadaab is minimal, as is clear from the statistics above. The
scope of this crisis is clearly illustrated by Verdirame, who
in his assessment of the human rights abuses in Kenyan
camps accuses UNHCR of “administering the camps in
ways which often appear to be blatant disregard of interna-
tional human rights standards.”33
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A comparison of the incidents of rape in Dadaab, where
a population of 130,000 resides, to those reported in 2002
for Mogadishu, the most dangerous and violent city in
Somalia for the past decade with a population of over one
million, illustrates the magnitude of insecurity prevailing
in Dadaab. A Somali human rights group active in
Mogadishu, the Dr. Ismael Jumale Human Rights Centre
(DIJHRC), documented 32 rape cases in Mogadishu for
2002.34 Again this number is probably a gross underestima-
tion of the actual number of rapes committed by militias in
Mogadishu; it nevertheless underscores the seriousness of
insecurity women in Dadaab camps experience. The high
incidence of violence in Dadaab is also a clear indication of
the failure of the host state to protect refugees on its terri-
tory.
Role of the Host State in a Refugee Crisis
The host state plays a crucial role in the reception and type
of settlement offered to refugees: either integration with the
host population or in limbo in peripheral regions. Geopoli-
tics often is key to these decisions. For example, Western
nations encouraged refugees from the eastern bloc during
the Cold War whereas, following the end of the East-West
divide, reception of refugees, i.e., those from the Balkan
wars, was tepid at best. Furthermore, regional conflicts can
encourage or discourage refugee flows from neighbouring
countries, either to discredit the other side, or to avoid a
spillover of political turmoil in neighbouring countries. The
latter is especially the case when the nations in the host state
include peoples of the same ethnic group(s) as the refugees.
For instance, neighbouring countries with historical border
disputes such as Somalia and Ethiopia each encouraged
refugees from the other side in the 1970s and 80s, whereas
Kenya, with the collapse of Somalia in 1991, was hostile to
the refugee influx. In the last case, the Kenyan government’s
encampment policies are closely tied to its apprehension of
refugees acting as  a destabilizing  force.  Containment of
refugees in closed camps facilitates the monitoring of unde-
sirable activities within that space.
State policies towards a refugee crisis are also partially
dictated by the pressures states experience from the West-
ern powers, which control the funds for “aid” and “loans.”
Kenya, for example, already facing reduction of aid due to
its human rights record, used the Somali refugee crisis to
negotiate for a continuation of international aid. “On the
one hand, the presence of large numbers of Somali refugees
in Kenya was held as evidence of Kenya’s improved human
rights record. On the other, Kenyan authorities threatened
to return these refugees forcibly if a renewal of aid was not
forthcoming.”35 Governments in addition influence how
the greater host population perceives refugees. Scapegoat-
ing refugees as responsible for all the social and economic
ills, often in reality preceding the refugee arrivals, often
fuels resentment of an already disfranchised populace
within the host population who might perceive neighbour-
ing “enemy” citizens on their territory as foreign and un-
desirable.36 The situation  of Somali refugees in  Kenyan
camps is therefore intrinsically tied to the colonially inher-
ited border disputes between post-independence Somalia
and Kenya, and the marginal position Somali-Kenyans oc-
cupy within the Kenyan state.
Finding solutions for protracted refugee situations, such
as refugees in Dadaab camps, remains a challenge for the
international community. However,  as discussed in the
next section, narrow definitions of how and what the best
course to address refugee crisis are results in the persistence
of limbo state for millions of refugees.
Durable Solutions: Prospects of Integration,
Resettlement, and Repatriation for Dadaab
Refugees
Almost all refugees in Dadaab are familiar with the three
preferred solutions for refugee crisis as stipulated by the
international refugee regime: integration into the host soci-
ety, resettlement in a third country, or repatriation to the
country of origin. Of the 130 refugees who participated in
consultations with Adelman and Abdi during a 2003 CARE
Canada consultancy field trip in Dadaab, almost all reiter-
ated the need to implement one of these options to terminate
their encampment.37 However, these solutions have so far
translated to guaranteed permanence of a limbo state for
Somali refugees in Kenyan camps.
As our discussion of the Kenyan government’s treatment
of Somali refugees illustrates, integration into the host
country for Somali refugees has not been tried as a viable
option, because if tried, it would have met very vocal oppo-
sition from landless locals. This is especially so given the
scarcity of arable land and the conflict about its ownership
in Kenya. Economic and political challenges confronting
Kenyans eliminate any provision of land and acceptance of
integration for these refugees on Kenyan territory. Further-
more, Kenya’s reluctance to pass a refugee bill that has been
under discussion for years now, despite hosting very large
numbers of Somali and Sudanese refugees starting in the
1980s, testifies to its ambivalence towards refugees.
UNHCR assumes responsibility for all refugees in Kenya,
who still lack any legal recognition within the Kenyan po-
litical system, despite its ratification of the refugee conven-
tions of both the UN and the Organization of African Unity
(OAU).
If integration is not a viable alternative, both resettle-
ment and repatriation have also remained elusive so far for
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Somali refugees in Dadaab camps. The percentage of reset-
tled refugees worldwide amounts to a dismal number. Of
the over twenty million persons dispersed around the world
in 2002, 55,500 or just about 0.3 percent of these refugees
were resettled in a third country.38 The numbers of Somali
refugees resettled by traditional refugee-receiving countries
such as Canada, the United States, and Australia have fur-
ther diminished since the September 11 terrorist attacks in
the U.S. For example, the 2002 UNHCR Annual Statistical
Report shows that the number of resettled Somali refugees
for that year was 640: 295 went to the U.S., 159 to New
Zealand, 116 to Canada, and smaller numbers to the Neth-
erlands, Norway,  and  Sweden.39 The current “terrorist”
rhetoric dominating immigration policies of most Western
nations, and the incidents of bombings in Kenya in which
Somalis were implicated, account for this decrease. These
dismal numbers highlight the limited opportunities  for
resettlement that exist for refugees in general, and for So-
mali Muslim refugees since the September 11, 2001, at-
tacks.40 This also underscores the problematic nature of this
option as a solution to end the limbo state of large numbers
of refugees.
Repatriation has also remained impossible for most refu-
gees in Dadaab. Here, however, lies a dilemma. Refugees
and UNHCR differ on the feasibility of this option as a
solution to the limbo state of refugees. A small percentage
of the thousands in Dadaab who signed up for voluntary
repatriation in 2001 with UNHCR have so far returned,
mainly to the Puntland region of Somalia. Unlike Somali
refugees in Ethiopian camps, the majority of whom are
already repatriated to Somaliland, UNHCR reports 220
refugees repatriated from Dadaab camps in 2002 and about
500 for 2003.41 UNHCR claims funding constraints hinder
its ability to repatriate the Somali refugees in Dadaab.
Adelman and Abdi’s consultations with refugee groups in
Dadaab overwhelmingly supported voluntary repatriation
provided they get some financial assistance to restart life.42
Despite the fact that many refugees in Dadaab come from
minority clans and/or rural backgrounds in the southern
regions of Somalia, most expressed a willingness to repatri-
ate to other regions, mainly to the northeast and northwest
of Somalia, if provided with some financial assistance to do
so. Many insisted that they are very aware of the material
and physical insecurities existing in many parts of Somalia.
However, they also argued that worse material and physical
insecurities persist in Dadaab camps. Refugees cited the
Somali proverb “laba kala daran mid dooro” (choosing the
best of two bad situations). Regardless of the risks involved
in life in Somalia, refugees argue they would at least have
freedom of movement and freedom to seek employment
opportunities. But with diminishing funding for all other
aspects of administering the camps, UNHCR claims that it
is unable to fulfill the desires of thousands of refugees.
Adelman et al. proposed an alternative to the costly yet
inadequate care and maintenance provided to refugees in
Dadaab for the last twelve years. This proposal argues that
repatriation for most Somali refugees should seriously be
considered:
We recommend that a meeting be held of donors so that they
pledge to give the same monies they now give for camp opera-
tions over the next five years, but an appropriate committee of
international agencies be given authority to use those guaran-
tees to obtain present funding for repatriation in flexible ways
to find the various durable solutions for the different groups of
refugees and different choices refugees make. The refugees will
return, but with conditions, conditions that deal with their
material security and security of education for their children.43
This proposal emphasized giving refugees real choices.
Here it is important to highlight that resettlement is not a
viable choice for most refugees, as illustrated by the statis-
tics above. This will, however, be encouraged for small
groups of refugees, such as some minority groups who feel
they cannot return to Somalia, vulnerable women and their
children, etc. As Kumin argued in her address at the 2003
G78 Annual Policy Conference, options such as the one
proposed here actually fit well with the current High Com-
missioner’s proposed “Convention Plus.” Consistent with
Adelman and Abdi’s insistence on avoiding the narrowly
defined mantra of “durable solutions,” “Convention Plus”
is about “develop[ing] new tools for today’s problems."
These tools include:
[C]omprehensive plans of action to ensure more effective and
predictable responses to mass influx or to protracted refugee
situations; development assistance targeted to achieve more
equitable burden-sharing and to promote self-reliance of refu-
gees and returnees; multilateral commitments for resettlement
of refugees; and the delineation of roles and responsibilities of
countries of origin, transit and destination. The underlying
premise is that specific commitments will lend themselves bet-
ter to binding agreements than broad policy exhortations.44
Durable solutions as they stand now are no more than
exhortations, often amounting to no commitment from the
international community. Exploring other options, and
freeing refugees from “imaginary” solutions for their
plight, should be at the top of the agenda of refugee-assist-
ing organizations. Also these options should include inter-
national concerted effort to contribute to peace-building
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initiatives in the refugee-producing regions, which will go
far in expediting the end of refugee limbo state.
Conclusion
The above analysis attempted to highlight the constraints
refugees in limbo face in their protracted camp life. It was
argued that dependency on aid in Dadaab remains the main
option open to most refugees, not because of lack of initia-
tive to provide for one’s family, but rather due to lack of
alternative livelihoods for the majority. In addition, research
clearly indicates that the refugees’ self-worth was affected by
their refugee status. “Refugee” identity is painted as dreaded
and undesirable. Moreover, violence, especially gender vio-
lence, remains epidemic in Dadaab, and insecurity remains
a top concern for all refugees. With Dadaab in its second
decade of existence, and world attention currently on the
war on “terrorism” and the aftermath of the war in Iraq,
securing funding for refugees in protracted situations in
peripheral regions is becoming extremely hard for interna-
tional organizations.
Given the grim picture painted by these findings, it is
paramount that states signatory to UN covenants on hu-
man rights endorse national legislation for the rights of
refugees in agreement with international laws. This would
certainly go a long way towards reducing the desperate
protracted situations of refugees in many parts of the world.
Even if governments are ultimately responsible for settle-
ment policies, and not international organizations which
have “no army to or access to coercive power to act on
behalf of refugees,”45 international organizations can and
should do more to use their presence in host countries.
Regrettably, once the emergency phase passes, inertia of the
international humanitarian bodies administering the
camps and the international community’s will to find solu-
tions sets in leaving refugees in a desperate state of limbo.
Yet literature provides us with enough case studies, with
lessons to be implemented for future crisis, to avoid repeat-
ing the same old scenarios: creation of camps as temporary
solutions to crisis; camps turning to semi-permanent set-
tlements where inadequate livelihoods and insecurities per-
sist. The long-term consequences of closed camps where
people are segregated from the general host population,
where freedom of movement is highly curtailed, where a
state resembling a “total institution” prevails, where state
of limbo in all areas of daily life persists, are underesti-
mated. It is time for the international community and
national and international organizations working with
refugees to explore other alternatives to address protracted
refugee situations.
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